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1 INTRODUCTION 2
A tree formulation for signaling games
Abstract. We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver
Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. The
analysis employs well established game theory ideas and concepts. We establish the ex-
istence of four perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game. We explain which equilibrium is
the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding
the formation of a language convention. Further, we discuss the informational content of
such signals and calibrate a more detailed definition of a true (“correct”) signal in terms
of the payoffs of the sender and the receiver.
Keywords and Phrases: Signals and signaling games, Actions, States of nature,
Language convention, Rational expectations equilibrium, Information set, Games with
imperfect information, Nash equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Beliefs updating.
.
1 Introduction
The philosopher, Professor D. Lewis (1969), writing on the origins and process of formation
of language discusses signaling games between a sender, who sends a signal, and its receiver.
In the Lewis formulation the sender is aware of the state of the world, but the receiver
is not. There are a number of alternative states and nature chooses one at random, i.e.
with a certain probability. Once the sender knows the state chosen, there are various
signals that he can use. There is a number of alternative actions that a receiver can take
in response to the signal received.
Following the specific actions of the sender and the receiver there are payoffs awarded to
both of them. These rewards express, for example, the utilities or money, obtained from
the combination of their actions. We note in particular the games of common interest in
which a resolution leads to optimal payoffs for both actors as noted by Skyrms (2010).
However this type of analysis is not always complete. Notably there is little discussion of
the case where the action of the receiver may be appropriate to the state of nature even
if the signal sent is not. There is no discussion of what happens to the payoffs of the two
agents when this is the case. Lewis makes an attempt to discuss what constitutes “true”
and “untrue” signals and responses in a signaling system. We discuss these issues below.
In terms of informal signaling conventions, Lewis offers the simple but illuminating exam-
ple of a helper, (H), referred to also as he, standing behind a truck gesturing to the driver,
(D), referred to also as she, to help her steer the truck into a narrow parking space. We
can assume that Nature consists of the particular position of the truck and of the parking
space and that there are two such combined alternatives each with probability 1/2.
The signaling behaviour and the action that follows is what Lewis describes as a “conven-
tional regularity” of unwritten rules of parking gestures based on experience to which all
parties conform. In terms of highest payoffs the common interest objective of H and D is
to get the truck into the space. In this situation, as he puts it:
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“The helper gestures as he does because he expects the D to respond as he does,
and the D responds as he does because he expects the helper to gesture as he
does.” (p. 127).
This means that the expectations of the actors are self-fulfilling and they both receive their
optimal payoffs. One can borrow concepts and approaches from neighbouring disciplines,
notably game theory and economics. They can provide a formal interpretation of the
outcome in terms of existing concepts in those areas (rational expectations, self-fulfilling
prophesies) using a fixed point theorem from mathematics. We return to this point below.
Of course this is not always the case. A deviation from this rule, perhaps based on lack of
trust, could lead to one or both of them getting inferior payoffs. The issue is to investigate
whether a “correct” interpretation of the signals is possible which would lead to such an
equilibrium position being reached. In such a situation no one would wish to independently
change his action if all the information was revealed and moreover the payoffs would be
optimal.
More formally, in a signaling problem there are alternative states of nature T1, T2,.., Ti, ..., Tn.
These are observed, let us say, by one sender, who will send a signal concerning the in-
formation received, i.e. the state chosen by nature. The receiver then has to choose an
action without knowing the state of nature. The sender compiles a set of alternative
signals s1, s2, ..., sj , ...sm using a function FH : {Ti} → {sj} . In other words, FH is the
function that translates the states of nature into communicated signals. In order to be
able to identify eventually the state with a signal we require m ≥ n.
Clearly there will be m!(m−n)! possible signaling systems, that is alternative FH ’s functions.
Suppose next that the set of actions available to D are r1, r2, ..., rk...rn. Given a signal sj
we define FD :
{
rk/(sj)
}
→ {Ti} . The function FD is designed to translate actions based
on a signal received into a maximum payoff for D. The signal received and the action
chosen combined with the state of nature implied by FD should lead to D’s maximum
payoff. (FH , FD) will be called a signaling convention. It is of course true that differently
designed signaling systems combined with an association between actions and states of
nature could produce the same result. I.e., an alternative convention (F ′H , F
′
D) has the
same outcome.
In the analysis above truthfulness in signaling is viewed as a signal that allows D to
correctly identify the state of nature. We also pointed out that different functions FH
may qualify.
Here we move one step further and consider truthfulness as a signal that leads to both H
and D receiving their maximum payoffs. The reason for this stricter definition is that D
might correctly guess the state of nature although H sends the wrong signal. In this case
H does not receive a high payoff.
The ideas and analysis in this area lend themselves to a game theoretical treatment and
this is what we discuss below in the context of a specific game. The philosophical and
game theoretic-economic approach can profit and enrich each other.
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2 A game tree approach
We introduce here the game theoretic analysis by concentrating on a H/D example which
is a detailed elaboration of the discussion by Lewis. The analysis is in terms of an appro-
priate, extensive form, tree formulation of a non-cooperative, signaling game. The set-up
is one with asymmetric information. The player who is informed, i.e. the helper here,
moves first to signal, truthfully or not, his information to the receiver, i.e. the driver.
The relevant concepts and ideas are discussed briefly, (see, for example, Binmore (1992),
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)).
Figure 1 gives the simple tree formulation of our game. There are two equally probable
states of nature, a truck must move Left (L) or Right (R), each with probability 1/2, and
two signals, l and r, that can be made by H. On the other hand, D can choose from two
alternative actions, l′ and r′, having heard the signal but without knowing the state of
nature. Therefore she does not know whether he is at node η1 or η2 of information set I1,
when he hears l neither if he is at node η3 or η4 of information set I2, when he hears r.
A play of the game starts from the initial node to a terminal point, where the game ends.
The payoffs at the terminal nodes refer to the payoffs of H, the upper number, and of D,
the lower number.
In the information set I1, enclosed by a parallelogram, player D does not know whether
she is at nodes η1 or η2. Similarly when D enters information set I2, she does not know
exactly where she is. This is a game of imperfect information. Obviously the action from
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the nodes of an information set are identical.
Pure strategies are rules that tell each agent what action to choose from each information
set. They can be played with probabilities as mixed strategies. The pure strategies of
H are (lr; ll, rl, rr) emanating from points 1 and 2, (L and R respectively). The pure
strategies of D are (l′r′, l′l′, r′l′, r′r′) from information sets I1 and I2 respectively. For
example l′r′ means that D plays l′ from information set I1 and r′ from information set
I2.
D’s mixed strategy is (l′l′, z1; l
′r′, z2; r
′l′, z3; r
′r′, z4), where, for example, l
′r′ means that
D plays l′ from information set I1 and r′ from information set I2 with probability z2.
Of course zi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and they sum up to 1. The mixed strategies of H are
analogously defined.
We are looking at the idea of an equilibrium in such a game. The general proof of existence
of an equilibrium in the set-up of abstract mathematical spaces is based on the concept
of the fixed point theorem. Under appropriate technical assumptions, a function from one
space to itself has fixed point, i.e. an element of the domain which maps onto itself. There
are a number of such theorems, depending on the generality of the mathematical conditions
imposed. Of course in particular explicit examples, like the one we are investigating, we
do not have to go through a formal proof of existence. We can simply check directly that
a set strategies satisfy the properties which characterize an equilibrium.
First, we consider the well known and widely used idea of a Nash equilibrium (NE). A
number of players with their own individual sets of (mixed) strategies are given and payoffs
depend on everybody’s action. A set of (mixed) strategies, one for each player is a NE,
if for each player his choice is a best response, in terms of payoff, given the other agent’s
action.
The payoffs show that when H reveals the “correct” signal and the correct action (the
one corresponding to the actual state of the world) by D follows, then they both receive
a payoff of 1. If H communicates an incorrect signal and this leads to an incorrect action
by D, then both players get 0. If H chooses an incorrect signal and D reacts counter to
the signal indicated then D gets 1 for performing the correct action but H ends up with
zero.
We set the probability that D plays l′ in I1 as z1 + z2 = 1 − p, while z3 + z4 = p is
the probability that D plays r′ in I1, z1 + z3 = 1 − q is the probability that D plays
l′ in I2 and finally z2 + z4 = q is the probability that D plays r
′ in I2. We note that
1− p, p and 1− q, q, shown in Figure 1, can be also thought of as behavioural strategies
describing how D chooses between the action from an information set. We shall return to
this immediately below. At this stage 1−p, p and 1−q, q the specific way the probabilities
zi are combined.
We can use the probabilities attached to the choices from I1 and I2, described in Figure
1, to fold the tree up, as seen in Figure 2, given the choices of the strategies and their
probabilities and can calculate the expected payoffs of H and D from left to right of the
new terminal nodes as (1− p, 1− p), (0, 1− q), (0, p) and (q, q). We emphasize that these
are expected payoffs of the two agents. We shall use this information in considering the
possibilities for NE.
Next we consider one more widely used idea in game theory. A perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (PBE) consists of a set of player’s optimal behavioural strategies, i.e. independent
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distributions on the nodes of each information set, and consistent with these a set of beliefs
which attract a probability distribution to the nodes of each information set. Consistency
requires that the decision from an information set is optimal given the particular player’s
beliefs about the nodes of this set and the available information. If the optimal play of
the game enters an information set the updating of beliefs must be Bayesian. Otherwise
appropriate beliefs are assigned arbitrarily to the nodes of the set. The assignment of
beliefs is a characteristic feature of a PBE.
The proof of existence of a PBE is also based on a fixed point theorem. In our explicit
example, we can simply check directly that a set of behavioural strategies satisfy the
properties which characterize an equilibrium.
The player uses independent distributions to choose between the action of the information
sets. For example she spins a wheel to decide between l′ and r′ in I1 and a wheel divided
differently for choosing when she is in I2. The same principle applies if information sets
are singletons, i.e. consist of the single point. This applies to sets 1 and 2 belonging to
H. In order to avoid introduce too much notation, we use again 1− p, p and 1− q, q, for
the behavioural strategies in I1 and I2 respectively. For H’s behavioural strategies at 1
and 2 we shall use the independent distributions 1− y, y and 1 − w, w, respectively for
choosing between l and r.
In calculating PBEs, the behavioural strategies of D will be used to fold the tree up, as
seen in Figure 2 and the expected payoffs of H and D from left to right of the new terminal
nodes are (1− p, 1 − p), (0, 1 − q), (0, p) and (q, q). Of course, as mentioned above, these
are expected payoffs.
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Our detailed presentation and analysis of the model show that there exist more than one
equilibria. This forces the analysis into a further argument for the choice of the most
reasonably expected one.
Finally we note that the structure of our model is such that there is a complete, one-to-one
correspondence between NE and PBE. The reason is because all the NE here are in pure
strategies. Such strategies define behavioural strategies as well. On the other hand it is
part of the definition of the richer PBE to consider beliefs and their updating, and their
consistency with strategies.
2.1 Lack of a NE or a PBE
We show here that for {0 < p < 1, q arbitrary} ∪ {0 < q < 1, p arbitrary}, there is no
NE and also no PBE either. We refer to Figure 1 and in particular to Figure 2.
We consider the possibility of a NE. The pair of probabilities (p, q) are seen as implied
directly from the zis of mixed strategies, which has been shown above. First we consider
the case {0 < p < 1, q arbitrary}. We point out that, as it is shown in the Appendix, any
such pair p, q can be realized by a set of feasible zis.
We inspect Figure 2. We consider as a candidate for a NE, player H to play lr (since
{0 < 1 − p < 1, q ≥ 0)}; but then D will respond with p = 0, q = 1 which does not
belong to the set of strategies above. If H was to play ll then D would respond again with
p = 0, q = 1, forcing H to play lr to become better off. Finally if H was to play rl or rr
then D would respond with p = 0, q = 1, forcing H to respond with lr. Hence none of
these strategies for H would lead to a Nash solution. Furthermore no mixed strategy for
H would lead to NE because D will use again p = 0 and q = 1.
We now consider {0 < q < 1, p arbitrary}. Again, as it is shown in the Appendix, any
such pair p, q can be realized by a set of feasible zis. We inspect again Figure 2. We
consider as a candidate for a NE, player H to play lr (since {0 < q < 1, p ≥ 0)}; but
then D will respond with p = 0, q = 1 which does not belong to the set of strategies
above. If H was to play ll then D would respond again with p = 0, q = 1 forcing H to
change his strategy to lr. Finally if H was to play rl or rr then D would respond again
with p = 0, q = 1, which is outside the set of strategies we are considering, forcing H
to respond with lr. Hence none of these strategies for H would lead to a Nash solution.
Furthermore no mixed strategy for H would lead to NE because D will use again p = 0
and q = 1 forcing D to play lr.
Next we consider the possibility of a PBE where the distributions on the choices between
the information set are taken to be independent from each other. We consider the case
{0 < p < 1, q arbitrary}. Suppose that H has chosen some pair of distributions (y, w).
The pairs (p, q) and (y, w) are not optimal. H will want to set y = 0 and then D will
respond with p = 1.
An analogous argument shows that for {0 < q < 1, p arbitrary}, and independently taken
distributions, the pairs (p, q) and (y, w) are not optimal.
2.2 The calculation of NEs and the PBEs
What we are doing here is to apply the following principles. The behaviour assumption
is that every agent chooses his best strategy given the strategy of the other. That is, in
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effect, a reaction function is formed. If each player optimizes believing, (prophesying), a
particular strategy for the other, and the outcome is that there is no reason for anybody to
feel they have predicted wrongly, then we a have an equilibrium which has been obtained
rationally. The confirmation of the predictions takes places where the reaction functions
intersect.
The analysis in the previous subsection implies we are only left to consider the four corner
cases (p = 0, q = 1), (p = 1, q = 1), (p = 0, q = 0), and (p = 1, q = 0) in Figure 3. We
shall show that they are all PBEs. However there is only one which can reasonably be
expected to prevail. In order to obtain this we need to invoke an extra argument over and
above the conditions for a NE or a PBE.
Case 1: p = 0, q = 1 This is shown in Figure 4. These probabilities imply z3 + z4 = 0
and z2 + z4 = 1. Hence z2 = 1 and D decides to play l
′r′ and the tree folds up into the
smaller one in Figure 4. The best response for H is to play play l from L and r from
R, hence the strategy lr. We write these pair of strategies as (lr, l′r′). to this, the best
response by D is to play l′r′. Hence the pair of pure strategies (lr; l′r′) form a NE.
Next we turn our attention to the existence of a PBE. We consider the set of pairs of
behaviour strategies of H and D given by ((l, 1; r, 1); (l′, 1; r′, 1)), where for example
(l, 1; r, 1) means that H at point 1 plays l with probability 1 and at point 2 he chooses r
with probability 1. It is straightforward to see that these pairs are optimal in the sense of
being a best response by an agent to the behavioural strategy of the other.
The calculations, through Bayesian updating, of the conditional probabilities, (beliefs),
attached to the nodes of I1 and I2 is based on these strategies.
Consider information set I1. The left-hand-side node is denoted by η1 and the right-hand-
side one by η2. We wish to calculate the beliefs attached to these nodes by D. Using the
Bayesian formula for updating beliefs, (see for example Glycopantis at al., 2003), we can
calculate these conditional probabilities. We know that I1 is entered only if H plays l.
Hence
Pr(n1/l) =
Pr(l/n1)× Pr(n1)
Pr(l/n1)× Pr(n1) + Pr(l/n2)× Pr(n2)
=
1× 1/2
1× 1/2 + 1× 0
= 1 (1)
Similarly we obtain the conditional probability Pr(n2/l) = 0
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On the other hand I2 is entered only if H plays r. The left-hand-side node is denoted by
η3 and the right-hand-side one by η4. Hence
Pr(n3/r) =
Pr(r/n3)× Pr(n3)
Pr(r/n3)× Pr(n3) + Pr(r/n4)× Pr(n4)
=
1× 0
1× 0 + 1× 1/2
= 0 (2)
Similarly we obtain the conditional probability Pr(n4/r) = 1
Finally, the optimality of the strategies given these beliefs can be easily checked. Hence
((l, 1; r, 1); (l′, 1; r′, 1)) a PBE. Of course it is connected to the NE because pure
strategies imply that the implied behavioural strategies played with probability 1 from
the relevant information set.
The expected payoffs are calculated as follows. H tells the truth always and gets expected
payoff 1/2×1 +1/2×1=1. D always makes the correct move and also gets expected payoff
1/2×1 +1/2×1=1.
We can provide some more explanation with respect to the expected payoffs. As expected
earlier a folded up tree can be obtained and now we are using the optimal strategies of H
given that p = 0, q = 1. In the folded up tree of Figure 4 it is clear the H must use l from
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point 1 and r from point 2. The NE and PBE follow.
Case 2: p = 1, q = 0 This is shown in Figure 5. Hence z3 + z4 = 1 and z2 + z4 = 0
implying z3 = 1. D decides to play r
′l′ and the full tree folds up into the smaller one in
Figure 5. A best response by H is to play rl and to this a best response of D is r′l′. Hence
the pair of pure strategies (rl; r′l′) form a NE.
With respect to the existence of a PBE, we consider the set of pairs behaviour strategies
of H and D given by ((r, 1; l, 1); (r′, 1; l′, 1)). It is easy to see that these pairs are
optimal. Namely, they are a best response by an agent to the behavioural strategy of the
other.
The calculations, through Bayesian updating, of the conditional probabilities, (beliefs),
attached to the nodes I1 and I2 are based on these strategies. The formulae used are
analogous to the ones in Case 1 and the values are shown in Figure 5. The optimality of
the strategies given these beliefs can be easily checked. Hence ((r, 1; l, 1); (r′, 1; l′, 1))
is a PBE.
The expected payoffs are obtained as follows. H never tells the truth and ends up with
expected payoff 0. D makes the correct move always, by playing the opposite of what H
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indicates, and ends with an expected payoff of 1. In the folded up tree of Figure 5 it is
clear the H must use r from point 1 and l from point 2. The NE and PBE follow.
We can provide some more detailed explanation with respect to the expected payoffs.
In the folded tree, given D’s choices, a payoff of 0 is indicated for H irrespective of his
strategies. The beliefs 0 and 1 in I1 are consistent with D playing r′. This gives expected
payoff 0×0+1×1 = 1 while playing l′ gives 0×1+1×0 = 0. Hence action r′ is preferable
to l′.
Also, the beliefs 1 and 0 in I2 are consistent with D playing l′. This gives expected payoff
1× 1 + 0× 0 = 1 while playing r′ gives 1× 0 + 0× 1 = 0. Hence action l′ is preferable to
r′.
Case 3: p = 0, q = 0 This is shown in Figure 6. These probabilities imply z3 + z4 = 0
and z2 + z4 = 0. Hence z1 = 1 and D decides to play l
′l′ and the full tree folds up into the
smaller one in Figure 6. A best response for H is to play ll and to this a best response of
D is l′l′. Hence the pair of pure strategies (ll; l′l′) form a NE.
With respect to the existence of a PBE, we consider the set of behaviour strategies of H
and D given by ((l, 1; l, 1); (l′, 1; l′, 1)). It is again straightforward to see that these
pairs are optimal in the sense of being a best response by an agent to the behavioural
strategy of the other.
The calculations, through Bayesian updating, of the conditional probabilities, (beliefs),
attached to the nodes I1 are based on these strategies. The formulae used are analogous
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to the ones in Case 1 and the values are shown in Figure 6. We note that the game never
enters I2, and hence 1 − x, x are arbitrary. In the Bayesian formula for updating, since
Pr(η3) = Pr(η4) = 0 we obtain 0/0.
The optimality of the strategies given the beliefs in I1 can be easily checked. Hence
((l, 1; l, 1); (l′, 1; l′, 1)) is a PBE.
The expected payoffs are calculated as follows. H always plays l. Hence he tells the truth
once with probability 1/2 and gets expected payoff 1/2 × 1. D always plays l′ i.e. she
makes the correct move once and gets expected payoff 1/2 × 1. In the folded up tree of
Figure 6 it is clear the H must use l from point 1 and he can also l from point 2. The NE
and PBE follow.
It is important to note that in this equilibrium the informational content of H’s signal is
zero and hence the (updated) beliefs of D in I1 are identical to the prior of the state of
nature. Professor Lewis refers in his book to inadmissible signals. The signal here which
conveys no information could be considered as an inadmissible one.
Case 4: p = 1, q = 1 This is shown in Figure 7. These probabilities imply z3+z4 = 1 and
z2 + z4 = 1. Hence z4 = 1 and D decides to play r
′r′ and the full tree folds up into the
smaller one in Figure 7. A best response for H is to play rr and to this a best response of
D is r′r′. Hence the pair of pure strategies (rr; r′r′) form a NE.
With respect to the existence of a PBE, we consider the set of behaviour strategies of H
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and D given by ((r, 1; r, 1); (r′, 1; r′, 1)). It is again straightforward to see that these
pairs are optimal in the sense of being a best response by an agent to the behavioural
strategy of the other.
The calculations, through Bayesian updating, of the conditional probabilities, (beliefs),
attached to the nodes I2 are based on these strategies. The formulae used are analogous
to the ones in Case 1 and the values are shown in Figure 7. The game never enters I1,
and hence 1 − x, x are arbitrary. In the Bayesian formula for updating, since Pr(η1) =
Pr(η2) = 0 we obtain 0/0.
The optimality of the strategies given the beliefs in I2 can be easily checked. Hence
((r, 1; r, 1); (r′, 1; r′, 1)) is a PBE.
The expected payoffs are calculated as follows. H always plays r. Hence she tells the
truth once with probability 1/2 and gets expected payoff 1/2 × 1. D always plays r′ i.e.
she makes the correct move once and gets expected payoff 1/2 × 1. In the folded up tree
of Figure 7 it is clear that H must use r from point 2 and he can also use r from point 1.
The NE and PBE follow.
Again, the informational content of H’s signal is zero in this Bayesian equilibrium.
It is important to note that also in this equilibrium the informational content of H’s signal
is zero and hence the (updated) beliefs of D in I1 are identical to the prior of the state of
nature.
2.3 Comparing equilibria
Examining the four equilibria established above, we see that we have an information
revelation problem. It is only in Case 1, where p = 0 and q = 1 that the signals of H
reveal to D the true state of the nature. In the Case 2, where p = 1 and q = 0, player H
always misreports the state and D responds by doing exactly the opposite of what she is
told to do. While one should stress that this also is a perfect equilibrium for the game, it
does implies zero expected payoff for H. He is punished for lying.
In the equilibria of Cases 3 and 4 player H’s signals do not reveal anything about the
state of the nature and the driver D sets her expectations in accordance with the prior
probabilities. The resulting, equilibrium expected payoff for H is inferior to that when he
tells the truth.
Both players know that inconsistent announcements by H will lead to wasteful outcomes
that will hurt him. Hence in such a context we have a truthful announcement. This can
result from pre-play, “cheap talk”, exhanges between the players, in which it was agreed
that the message sent by the sender will be truthful. (Binmore (1992, 2007), Rasmusen,
2007, Barrett, 2009). The incentives of H and D are compatible. Player D can reasonably
expect, and correctly guess, that H has an interest to observe the agreement and tell the
truth. She comes to this conclusion on the basis of the structures of the payoffs, and thus
uses an extra argument for choosing among the four PBEs. This is over and above the
arguments which establish equilibrium strategies.
The equilibrium in Case 1 is the most likely to prevail. H knows that if he plays l only
when he sees L and r only when he sees R, then D will prefer to play l′r′ rather than,
for example, r′l′. This means that it is in the interests of H for his signaling actions to be
truthfully revealing of the state of nature.
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Of course, in deciding among the four PBEs examined above, H must find a way to
communicate to D that he intends to do so. Clearly this is done on the basis of the
expected payoff of the sender of the signal. D will rightly assume that H will want to do
the best for herself in terms of payoffs and thus play lr.
Therefore we can define what is meant by “truth” and a true signal. In our example, if
the convention is set as the one where r corresponds to R and l corresponds to L then any
other signaling system used is punishing at least one of the agents with a lower payoff,
even if it results to a possible PBE. We return to this point in the following section.
3 Further discussion and conclusions
3.1 Discovering and updating the informational content of signals
We try to place, briefly, our analysis in a wider context of the literature. Skyrms (1996)
follows Lewis’s work and develops, in effect, the dynamics of repeated games. He explains
how individuals can converge to a common convention setting that indicates which signal
is to be sent in a particular situation, as well as the receiver’s action for each type of signal
communicated by the sender.
In a later article, Skyrms (2010) stresses the importance of the informational content of
transmitted signals in updating beliefs. Nature chooses the state and then sends signals
to intermediary receivers (senders). They can convey the information received to other
agents through actions in the form of communicated signals. The informational content of
signals alters the prior probabilities of states, as a result of the receiver updating his/her
beliefs. This updating that takes place relative to the initial prior probability of a state
of nature determines the informational content carried by a signal. Intuitively, the lower
the prior probability, the higher the informational content of an accurate signal, i.e. one
that is more likely to be representative of the true state of nature.
In the Lewis signaling game the sender and the receiver learn how to play through experi-
encing successes and failures in repeated rounds of the game. This leads to the evolution of
a sigaling game, e.g. a “convention”. This signaling system evolves through reinforcement
learning. It takes the form of rewards for correct choices by the receiver for both of the
agents. The accumulation of these rewards leads to the updating by the receiver of the
probabilities of the states of nature.
In Barrett’s article instead of through rewards, updating takes the form of adding balls to
the sender’s urn of the correct signal, i.e. when the receiver’s action matches the actual,
given state of the world. Balls are also added to the receiver’s corresponding action urn.
Originally the balls in the urns correspond to the prior probabilities of the different states
of nature. The adding of balls to the signal and action urns changes the relative proportion
of balls in each urn and we have a process of continuous updating. This results in the
formation of a matching law (Herrnstein, 1970).
Here we adopt a more formal approach. In section 2.2, using the Bayesian formula, we saw
the mathematical formulation of updating beliefs held by the receiver in light of the signal
received. If one wanted, as an extension of the current analysis, to work within a framework
of repeated games with signals received each period, one could use a Bayesian updating
reiterating process. This would adjust beliefs regarding the evolving trustworthiness of a
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repetitive signal, concerning the probability of a specific state of nature, Ti.
Consider, for example, the formula
a = Pr(T i | C, a0,K) =
a0
a0 + λC(1− a0)
.
a indicates the informational content of the signal for a given state of nature. It has prior
a0, starting time “0”, a running time ofK periods, a learning speed convergence parameter
0 < λ < 1, and a cumulative experience cardinality C, where C =
K−1∑
j=0
hj ; hj = 1 for each
period the signal is correct and hj = 0 when it is not.
This updating formula is in effect an extension of the Bayesian updating used in this
paper, and could be more appropriate for a mathematical formulation of a repeated game.
This dynamic formula in which α tends to 1 could be considered as a background to the
completed process in which our presentation rests.
One can note that there may be cases where there is plentiful information about the
states in the signals, but zero information in the act that will be chosen by its receiver.
This applies if the receiver always performs the same act irrespective of the signal. This
case has been explored in depth in the economics literature of herding behaviour.
As an example of this, in the formation of investment cascades there is no longer rein-
forcement learning. The actions performed by the receiver of a private signal (for example
a signal whether or not to invest in a particular project which may be either a good
(profitable) or bad (loss making) investment, is no longer an indicator of her private
information. Instead, a potential investor follows the same act as his/her predecessors
irrespective of what his/her private information indicates. (See, for example, Bannerjee
(1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Choi et al. (2000), Welch (1992) among many other
authors on this type of behaviour). This is a case of signal jamming.
3.2 Convention formation - a simplifying approach
The simple example analysed in this paper leads to a perfect signaling game. Two signals
are easily matched to the two possible states of the world and the sender and the receiver
learn how to correlate their actions. Thus this game suggests a “coding” that leads to the
construction of a truthful signaling mechanism where the helper has an interest to signal
the true state of nature. This is what is referred to as a “truthful mechanism design”
(Aggarwal et al., 2005).
However as Barrett argues, one may think of even more complex games. For example,
there may be four states of nature, {Ti} : {N,S,E,W}, each occurring with an equal
prior probability of 14 , two senders, one receiver and two types of signals, e.g. 0 and
1. The senders coordinate their actions and can send four types of binary signals {sj} :
{00, 01, 10, 11} . The receiver is aware of which sender each signal originates from. She
knows that 01 means that sender A sends signal 0 and sender B sends signal 1.
It is possible for a perfect signaling game to evolve where the senders coordinate their
actions. For example 00 means W , 11 means S , 01 means E and 10 means N . However
the receiver needs to understand (learn) the correspondence between states and signals.
Then this information can be used in deciding his/her action.
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Both the binary signals themselves as well as their ordering, ”syntax” in Barrett’s terminol-
ogy, are important for a fully revealing signaling game. An accumulation of confirmations
of states through rewards can lead to the formation of a convention that takes the form
of a language.
Barrett notes that the signaling success rate in such a case is about 3/4 of simulation
runs, which, while not ideal, is better that the a priori probability of 1/4 for each state.
He further notes that if we reinforce the incentives for learning by adding punishments
for failures, this will accelerate and significantly improve the chances of a perfect signaling
game.
We purpose an alternative signaling (coding) approach which involves the option of silence
(hamming codes) to indicate a possible state of the world. For example we can assume
that sender A, through an adaptive process, becomes an N or S expert and she indicates
this by 0 and 1 correspondingly, but remains silent in the other two states of the world.
Equally sender B is an E or W expert and she indicates so by 0 and 1 respectively,
whereas he keeps silent when N or S occur. The receiver observes of which sender the
signal originates from and therefore silence from the first sender and a signal of 1 from
the second sender, i.e. a combination silence, 1 indicates W . The initial state is N or S if
sender A sends a signal, and E and W if sender B sends a signal. In each case the game
eventually collapses to the tree formation which our article examines. Silence belongs to
the category of non - events or “invisible” actions, (e.g. Choi et al. 2000). It is in this
direction that future research could be developed.
3.3 Concluding remarks
It is remarkable how neighbouring disciplines such as philosophy on the one hand, and
game theory and economics on the other, can come close to the understanding and analysis
of important issues. The philosophical and mathematical rigours complement each other.
This is the motivation of our discussion.
In this paper we analyse in detail, from the point of view of game theory, the signaling
game discussed by Professor Lewis. Our approach is different from, but complementary to
his. We place the model in a rigorous game theory, extensive form, decision tree framework
and analyse the perfect Bayesian equilibria, as well as the Nash equilibria. We explain
and then deploy well established game theory ideas and concepts.
We provide a discussion of the informational content and significance of the signals and
the formation of beliefs in each of the above equilibria. We invoke a further argument to
explain that one particular equilibrium, out of the four existing ones is the most likely to
prevail. This is an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention.
Furthermore we provide a more detailed definition of a true (“correct”) signal in terms
of the payoffs not only of the receiver (as it is common in the literature) but also of the
sender of such signals.
The quote from Professor Lewis work in the introduction refers us to the well known
concepts in economic analysis of rational expectations and self-fulfilling prophesies. These
ideas refer to a situation in which the decisions of agents are locked in at a fixed point. As
optimal reactions to each other’s actions they confirm themselves. We employ the specific
terminology for equilibria used in game theory. Our calculations of the equilibria confirm
the statement by Professor Lewis.
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Finally, we suggest the possibility and consider briefly an alternative approach, using the
option of silence that may be deployed in more complex signaling games with multiple
signals and states of nature.
Appendix
We consider here the following linear system:
z1 + z2 = 1− p
z3 + z4 = p
z1 + z3 = 1− q
z2 + z4 = q,
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The question is whether there is always a non-negative
solution for arbitrary p and q.
The family of solutions is given by
z4 = z
z3 = p− z
z2 = q − z
z1 = 1− p− q + z,
where z must be non-negative and must also satisfy z ≤ p, q and z ≥ p+ q − 1. There is
a range of z that satisfies these relations as long as min(p, q) ≥ max(p+ q − 1, 0) which is
true always. It is straightforward to show that all solutions are of this form.
The result here is used in the text with explicit reference.
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